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Abstract. The paper explores the role of the gravity variables in explaining the
FTA-s formation. We develop a new theoretical benchmark for the use of the gravity
equation modeling them as fixed resources in the budget constraint of the Nash equi-
librium definition of an FTA. We show the existence of an endogenous relationship
between gravity variables and bilateral trade so that we code FTA-s as a quantita-
tive variable and we use the simultaneous equations method of estimation on 30195
observations from 1960-2000. There is evidence for bilateral trade being the main
determinant of free trade agreements. Other statistically significant relationships are
the sharing a common language or common cultural heritages well as being a former
colony of the same colonizer which are positively correlated with the FTA formation.
JEL Classification: free trade agreements, gravity equation, Nash equilibrium
Keywords: F13, F53, F59
1. Introduction
The existence of Free Trade Agreements (FTA-s) is frequently associated with glob-
alization or economic growth and it has been also used as precursor of economic inte-
gration as for example Europe Agreements with countries from Central East Europe.
Nowadays, almost every government concerned with the situation of their country’s
bilateral external exchanges find themselves confronted with the necessity of choosing
between two main policy options, WTO membership and free trade negotiations or not.
In this paper we aim to continue the previous work concerning the determinants of Free
Trade Agreements integrating these policy options. In particular we address one of the
problems previously encountered in the literature in empirically estimating the FTA-s
determinants, the endogenous relationship between the variables in the gravity equa-
tion of trade and the bargaining country’s bilateral volume of trade. Given the policy
choices that the governments face we acknowledge the need to use a model allowing for
the estimation of both the political and economic nature of trade agreements. Grossman
& Helpman (1995) have written one of the most comprehensive studies explaining the
politics of free trade agreements in an economic framework which is almost exclusively
build up on their relationship with the quantity of output produced and exported by
one nation’s industries. However, the first attempt to empirically estimate the FTA-s
determinants belongs to Baier & Bergstrand (2004) who have been estimating only the
economic determinants and they couldn’t the bilateral volume of trade in the regression
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because of a significant drop in the power of explanation of the model. The method em-
ployed has been the same used gravity equation of trade employed based upon a model
build to include the transport costs. We show that the unexpected drop in the power
of explanation of the model is due to the already mentioned endogenous relationship
between the gravity variable and bilateral trade. The most recent example of applica-
tion of the gravity equation in trade is of Rose (2004) who shows that despite WTO
economic rationality to increase trade there is not strong empirical evidence to support
it. Another aspect we believe should be take care of in any empirical estimation of
agreements is the stability of the negotiated outcome as ensured by the requirement of
being a Nash equilibrium. For this we employ the definition of an equilibrium agreement
provided by Grosaman and Helpman (1995). Their equilibrium agreement determined
through the bargaining over the exclusion of an industry we adapt it for the bargaining
over the inclusion or exclusion of a country in the agreement. The Nash solution of the
bargaining we use it as a benchmark for modeling the free trade agreements.
2. Theoretical framework
The countries involved in negotiations for the signing of a free trade agreement areC ∈
{1, 2, ....., i} . The outcome may be either negotiations breakdown with a probability
of αi or the actual agreement over trade liberalization with the associated probability
of (1− αi) . In negotiations, the governments seek to maximize a common linear
objective function G1X2 (pe) = a
2C1 (pe)+a
1C2 (pe)+a
1a2 (W 1 (pe) +W
2 (pe subject to
the budget constraint E
(
pe, FTA
(
pe,W
C
))
= I (pe, R) . Otherwise, the governments
choose non-cooperation by maximizing their welfare individually, GC = C1 + a1W 1 .
The outcome of the negotiation is the equilibrium agreement,
max
∑
C=1,2
nC log
{∫ [
αiG
CXC + (1− αi)GC
]
di−GC
}
where nC is a Nash weight attached to the outcome and pe is the international
equilibrium price so that countries evaluate the welfare change from FTA formation
taking the world price as given and R are here only fixed resources which we use it
as proxy for geopolitical constraints from the gravity equation. It follows that each
government evaluates the value of the free trade agreements against the status quo
welfare. Note that
FTA =
{
max logG1X2,αi = 1
0, αi = 0
where the probability of concluding an agreement is αi = 1 and αi = 0 is the probability
of negotiations breakdown. In bilateral negotiations, country 1 evaluates the gain from
the maximization of the common governmental welfare function against the maximum
value of its individual governmental welfare function. The same reasoning is valid for
country 2 too. The solution of the first order condition of the maximization problem
is,
log
{
a2Y 1 + a1Y 2 + a1a2
[(
Y 1 −D1)+ T 1 + (Y 2 −D2)+ T 2]} = log [Y 1 + a1 (Y 1 −D1)+ a1T 1]
2
-Gc
s.t
(
Y C −DC) = R
while Y C is the internal production potential,
(
Y C −DC) are the bilateral trade and
TC represents governmental gains from trade, C ∈ {1, 2} .
3. Empirical method and the data
We have obtained the same theoretical structure as Baier Bergstrand (2004). How-
ever they used the qualitatively dependent variable method of estimation incorporating
the budget constraint in the main definition of an equilibrium agreement. Two main
problems have been encountered following this method: 1) it was not possible to draw
conclusions on the quantitative effects of the regressors and 2) due to bilateral flows
endogeneity they have been completely eliminated from analysis. Political determi-
nants have been also completely excluded while from all geo-political variables usually
modeled in the gravity equation although most of them statistically significant only the
bilateral distance has been found with significant power of explanation in the model.
We deal with all these left out remarks within the theoretical framework above. In
the first order condition of the FTA maximization problem the logarithm is a useful
benchmark to capture the influence of all influences in a single variable. We code the
dependent variable as the product of all variables influencing the common welfare (real
GDP of both countries as well as the volume of trade and a political dummy variable
capturing WTO membership) multiplied by the probability of observing an FTA. The
dependent variable coded in this way varies between 0 when there is not an FTA and
the maximum value represented by the combined influence of the common welfare vari-
ables. We use the properties of the logarithm to multiply all the values but it cannot
be applied because of the 0 values assigned to the common gain from FTA formation.
The in dependent variable is the gain from status quo. In other words, the dependent
variable measures the gains of non-cooperation so that we code it with the purpose of
searching potential conflict within the variables defining the FTA. Therefore, we use
as regressors a combination of the real GDP and the volume of trade correlating the
economic power with trading potential. Geopolitical constraints in each equation do not
vary in time therefore we treat them as fixed using a year dummy variable interacting
with each variable from the gravity equation. In order to avoid the problems caused by
endogeneity we use the three stages least squares estimate. In the first stage we account
for endogeneity between FTA and imports/exports, in the second stage endogeneity
between imports/exports and in the last stage we include imports/exports determinant
variables.
Data
We collect data from Baier Bergstrand on the existence of an FTA for the period 1960-
2000. Data on real gross value of national product is from Pen World Table while
data on bilateral trade flow is provided from the project Correlates of War available on
internet. Gravity variables are used from the CEPII database. We have 86 countries
in the sample grouped 3414 pairs. We have dropped few of the countries from the
Baier Bergstrand dataset due to missing GDP data. The bilateral trade flows data
includes the missing variables for one important reason. There are many 0 values for
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missing trade between countries so that that data cannot be normalized through normal
procedures. Since we cannot normalize the data we replace the missing values so that
the regressed variables folow a normal distribution. Our main motivation for coding
the data with the 0 values included (usually 0 trade flows values are dropped from
the analysis ) is that exclusion decreases significantly their power of explanation for
the non-existence of an FTA while it is not consistent with the reality. The Europe
Agreements have been based almost exclusively on the degree of integration in trade
between partners which it has changed abruptly from 0 to high values after the collapse
in communism in Central East Europe. Indeed, we have counted 8578 bilateral trade
0 values associated with a missing FTA and only 24 bilateral trade 0 values associated
with an existing FTA. Moreover, there are 10709 of 0 values for imports associated with
the a missing FTA and respectively 11131 of 0 values for exports.
4. Results and discussion
Empirical estimation of bilateral trade has been of much focus and discussion in the
economic literature. The most notable contribution is of Baldwin (1971) who use the
net exports to estimate Hecksher-Ohlin theoretical framework. Following the Gross-
man&Helpman (1995) discussion on politics of free trade agreements we are concerned
each step whether imports or exports have a greater power of explanation for the signing
of an FTA. Since one’s country imports are the other countries exports we sort out the
influence by checking the robustness of results of imports versus exports. The results
of the regression are robust if one country being predominantly importer or exporter
doesn’t change the statistical relationship between variables of the Nash properties of
the outcome of negotiations are verified. Further, Tradeflows1 = (GDP 1 ∗ Exports)
as independent variables represents the first country’s exports related to its economical
power while Tradeflows2 = (GDP 2 ∗ Exports) are the second country’s imports re-
lated to the country 2 economic power as represented by the real GDP. We first estimate
empirically the equations,
FTA = β0 + β1
(
GDPC ∗ Imports/Exports)+ β2 Imports+ β3 Exports+ ε0
Imports/Exports = ζ0 + ζ1FTA+ ζ2Exports/ Imports +ζ3
(
GDPC ∗ Im ports/Exports)+ ε1
Exports/ Imports = γ0 + γ2 lnDis t +γ2Comborder+
+ γ4Samecountry + γ5Comcolony
+ γ6Comlanuageoff + γ7Comlangethno+
+ γ8Curentcolony + γ9Colony45 + ε3
We are centering the discussion on the manner trade flows are defined in either im-
ports of exports and we report the desirability and the power of explanation of the
gravity variables when the conflict relationship is accounted for. We relate our analysis
to country 1 using the variance in country 2 policy choices. Results are reported in
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Dependent variable Coefficient Correlation
Bilateral FTA
Constant -0.144***
(0.004)
GDP2*Imports 0.226** 0.84
(0.083)
Imports 0.451** 0.66
(0.198)
Exports 0.196* 0.48
(0.119)
Observations 30195
R2 0.72
Dependent variable
Imports
Constant 0.041**
(0.010)
FTA 0 .144* 0.82
(0.084)
GDP2*Imports 0.688*** 0.98
(0.081)
Exports 0.233*** 0.90
(0.024)
Observations 30195
R2 0.94
Dependent variable
Imports
Constant -0.084
(0.010)
lndist1960 - 0.043*** -0.26
(0.014)
lndist1965 -0.054*** -0.07
(0.014)
lndist1970 -0.034** -0.03
(0.014))
lndist1975 -0.011 0.03
(0.014)
lndist1980 -0.036*** 0.02
(0.014)
lndist1985 -0.035** 0.03
(0.014)
lndist1990 0.009 0.06
(0.014)
lndist1995 -0.010 0.10
(0.014)
lndist2000 0.028** 0.10
(0.014)
Observations 30195
R2 0.09
*p≤ 0.10; ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01
Endogenous variables: FTA, imports, Exports Exogenous variables: GDP*Imports/Exports,
Distance Note: The year dummy variables have been regressed as qualitative variables
interacting with the gravity one to capture the fixed effect over time. The time dummy
variable have not been included in the table.
Table 1. FTA determinants - real GDP and importing conflict potential
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Table 1 for the country 2 imports and exports when the country is considered mainly
importer. At the same time we are concerned if the coefficients from the regression have
the same sign as the one resulting from a simple correlation. There is a positive correla-
tion between the FTA gain from the combined influence of the real GDP and imports.
This means that the higher are the economic power associated the more dependent is
the country on imports and there is more desirability for the FTA formation. At the
same time international trade is balance if higher volumes of imports are associated
with higher volumes of exports. Equation 2 confirms this very well know result. In
the third equation we include also dummy variables for time and the gravity variables.
The greater the distance between the capitals of the bargaining countries there is less
desirability for the free trade agreement. This geographical constraint has a constant
negative impact on FTA-s over the years while for some years is positively related. The
previous analysis suggests that higher volumes of bilateral trade increase the desirabil-
ity of signing a free trade agreement and the coefficients estimated for the the distance
are not stable. In the next section we include the other geopolitical constraints in the
regression and we search a stable Nash solution of an equilibrium agreement. Regres-
sors are all dummy variables for being a former part of the same country, sharing a
common border, language, ethnography, being a former colony of the same colonizer
currently or in 1945. Since all are dummy variable some of them might be interact-
ing with the quantitative ones already included in the model. For instance, when we
regress the distance at the same time with sharing the common border, both being
geographical constraints in the gravity equation, we find a negative correlation between
the desirability of an FTA and common border which is not what we expected. So that
we perform the three stages least squares estimate including every gravity variable at
a time and we compare stability of the coefficients and the goodness fit of the model
for each of them. The results of the regression are presented in the next table.
[Table 2 here]
We found an approximately equal impact from each gravity variable in the model
but it should be also noted that sharing common historical background as for example
having the same colonizer as regressor improves the goodness of fit of the model and
it is one of the gravity variables with the highest impact on the desirability of forming
an FTA. In the same order of priorities being currently a colony is an important de-
terminant of FTA-s followed by the geographical variables reflecting the existence of a
common border or being a part of the same country. These variables are statistically
significant especially for the years of beginning of globalization in 1960-1970 which is
a historical period marked by political efforts of reintegration and peace so that is not
surprising that neighbors countries or countries formerly belonging to the same entity
have searched economic ties for cooperation. Within this group of influences imports
have a different type on influence on FTA-s if we change the countries geopolitical char-
acteristics. Higher imports between countries which have had the same colonizer are
associated with a lower desirability of trade liberalization as compared with the case
of using the geographical distance. The second stage of the regression implies that the
result is valid for countries with lower economic power as reflected by a lower real GDP.
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The full model suggests the highest goodness of fit for this gravity variables implying
that most of the FTA-s existing today are signed by the less developed countries with
common historical background and high imports. On the contrary, free trade agreements
based on geographical proximity are signed between the most developed countries.
5. Robustness
Our previous results are confirmed if it can be verified for exports too so that changing
players characteristics doesn’t change the outcome of the bargaining.
[Table 3 here]
We have found an improved power of explanation of the model when exports are
used as determinant of the FTA-s so we proceed further in the analysis using exports.
Common colony is still the most significant determinant of free trade agreements but
when the geographical distance is used the signs of the coefficients change when the
country is considered exporting as compared to importing. When distance is used as
regressor the correlation of FTA determinants changes so that the model estimated
cannot be a Nash equilibrium. An interesting result follows from the endogenous re-
lationship between imports and exports and the free trade agreement. The second
stage least squares estimate suggest that the FTA membership is associated with lower
exports resulting probably from the lack of protectionist incentive to export while a
lower level of exports is associated with a higher desirability of trade liberalization in
the first stage of the estimation. The results are similar for imports and we conclude
that the vicious circle trade flows-free trade agreements relationship promotes free trade
globally. The bilateral volume of trade is likely to be higher for countries that share a
common cultural background or have a common official language. Our results confirm
the common intuition in concluding international affairs.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the politico-economic determinants of free trade agree-
ments accounting for the endogenous relationship between variables. Using the Nash
equilibrium properties of an equilibrium trade agreement we have been concerned to
identify those determinants that show stability of the parameters estimates. The geopo-
litical fixed and inherited characteristics of a country should not be considering imped-
ing for trade liberalization. On the contrary, the most significant power of explanation
for the model is given by the usual economic characteristics (imports and exports) which
can be influenced through policy actions. There is a positive correlation between the
FTA desirability and the bilateral volume of trade but a negative correlation with the
real GDP showing that the global low proliferation of free trade agreements is due to
the low level exports associated with the high poverty of the less developed countries.
This model is to our knowledge the first attempt of finding stationarity in empirical
of free trade agreements through reliance on the Nash concept of an equilibrium trade
agreement
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